You play the manager with the Game Strategy Explorer

When your team's manager makes an on-field decision, what he’s essentially doing is calculating likely outcomes – probabilities, essentially. “Will this choice make my team more likely to win – or less” is the thought process, no matter whether we’re talking ordering a sacrifice bunt, sending out the intentional walk signal, or any number of hundreds of other choices that you may or may not actually see happening in real-time.

At times, that choice is based on cold hard data; for others, it’s more about gut feel gained from decades in the sport. (The best managers, we think, blend both of those things into a final call.)

The data part of what we’re describing here has long been known as “Win Probability,” a decades-old measure which looks at the game situation (inning, score, number of outs, and runners on base) and tells you the average outcome over years and years of data. There’s only so many possible combinations of those situations, after all. We’ve seen everything before, some many, many times.

For example: when the Pirates put up 10 runs in the sixth inning on Monday to take a 15-1 lead, their win probability was 99.9%, which says that teams essentially never blow that kind of lead. But on Tuesday, when Tigers shortstop Kevin McGonigle walked with two outs in the bottom of the 8th in a 1-1 tie, it pushed Detroit’s win probability from 45% to merely 55%, which says that a game in that spot can still really go either way.

You’ve been seeing these numbers for years, often when MLB.com stats analyst Sarah Langs highlights the wildest swings.

What you can do now, with Baseball Savant’s new “Game Strategy Explorer,” is plug in any situation you like and see what the baseline numbers actually say.

For example: Should you call for a sac bunt down one in the ninth, with a runner on first and no outs? If it works, trading an out for second base is a bad deal (a decline for the hitting team of 4.9% win probability). If the lead runner gets thrown out, it’s a really bad deal (-29.2%). The only actually good outcome is if it doesn’t result in an out at all, putting runners on first and second (+17.6%).

Here’s what this intentionally doesn’t do: Attempt to identify the hitter or the pitcher at the plate. Surely, you’d treat Aaron Judge differently than you would a lesser hitter; surely, you’d take into account platoon situations when deciding whether to intentionally walk the batter at the plate. Consider those things the extra, in-the-moment value of the manager, who can start with the baselines we’ll share here – the average outcomes over the last decade of play – and then mentally adjust as needed based on who’s on the field and how they’re playing at that exact moment.

What would we find if we look back at a few recent – and not so recent – high-profile decisions?

The Rockies walk the bases loaded for Xander Bogaerts, Apr. 9, 2026

Bottom 12th, tie game, runner on third, one out

There was a lot happening in this one.

Jake Cronenworth started as the runner on second, and Fernando Tatis Jr. bunted him to third. That’s a minor positive for San Diego (+2.8%), because as the home team, you need just a single run here, not several. Now with a runner on third and one out, the Rockies intentionally walked Jackson Merrill, which is a minor positive for Colorado, as it sets up the double play, but is hardly a needle-mover (-0.9% for San Diego’s chances).

With first and third, they also walked Manny Machado, loading the bases, which puts a game-ending walk into play, giving San Diego that small advantage back (+1.3%).

The fact that Xander Bogaerts ended up walking it off with a grand slam sure made it all look bad, but it's easy to see what Colorado was doing here, too.

The problem, really, was the initial situation: Man on third, one out. In a walk-off situation, that gives the home team an 83.3% win probability. The intentional walks barely moved the needle in either direction, because you can set up the double play, yet also make a walk fatal.

Since none of this affected the game situation very much, it was as much or more about which good Padres hitter you wanted to face, and going by the 2026 projections, Bogaerts is less imposing a batter than Merrill or Machado. That it didn’t work doesn’t change the face that it wasn’t likely ever to work.

Matt Chapman’s stolen-base attempt, Apr. 5, 2026

Bottom 9th, down three runs, runner on first, no outs

This isn’t so much “historically notable” as it is “recent,” and really it gives us an opportunity to show the excellent Mets broadcast absolutely losing their minds about what an inopportune time it was to attempt a steal.

It’s not great. The Giants were in a bad spot regardless – nine times out of 10, being down three with a runner on and no outs in the ninth leads to a loss, which is what the 9.2% win probability is saying there.

Still, even a successful steal would have added very little value (+0.9%, a barely perceptible gain) while getting thrown out essentially ended any chance they had at all (-7.4%, dropping them down to "it takes a miracle" territory at 1.8%). They did not receive a miracle. Rafael Devers didn't reach, and after a Heliot Ramos single, Jung Hoo Lee's strikeout ended the game.

It might even be slightly worse in reality, because as we said, this looks at the average situation, not the specific players involved. That’s important here, because Chapman was trying to steal on Luis Torrens, arguably the best-throwing catcher in the game, and also with Devers, the most dangerous San Francisco hitter (regardless of his slow start) at the plate.

“That’s just bad baserunning on my part,” Chapman said, explaining that reliever Devin Williams had been slow to the plate and that he didn’t want to be caught up in a double play. “If I could do it over again, I would not elect to steal that base. I was paying attention, I just made a bad, bad decision there. … That’s completely my fault.”

The math agrees.

The Game 7 bunt that probably didn't cost the Blue Jays a ring

Bottom 11th, down one run, runner on second, no outs

“Did the Blue Jays Blunder a World Series With a Bunt?,” read one prominent newspaper headline, and while we’re not so sure we’d go that far, this is exactly what kind of situation this tool is here for.

It’s the bottom of the 11th inning. The Dodgers had taken a 5-4 lead in the top of the 11th on Will Smith’s go-ahead homer. When Vladimir Guerrero Jr. led off the bottom of the frame with a double against Yoshinobu Yamamoto – famously out for a third inning on zero days' rest – the Blue Jays saw their win probability double from 20% to 45%. That’s how valuable getting a runner into scoring position in a one-run game can be. Their chances doubled.

The next batter, Isiah Kiner-Falefa, laid down a successful sacrifice bunt, pushing Guerrero to third. The bunt was perfectly placed, and well-executed. IKF could hardly have done it better. But was it a good idea?

The data says: Not really. Even though it worked, this one actually cost the Blue Jays 2.4% worth of win probability, because while gaining the base was a little valuable, Guerrero had already been in scoring position, and it came at a huge cost to get there: losing one of the three outs you have left.

That's assuming it worked, too, which it doesn't always -- bunting is harder than people think. Had IKF put down the bunt and it didn't get Guerrero over, that's even more damaging (-15.8%). If he'd done it and gotten Guerrero thrown out, that's even worse (-23.4%). And if it was a double play? Absolute disaster: A -40.1% hit that would have essentially ended Toronto's chances.

Really, the only way that this math works for the Jays is if IKF reaches, regardless of whether Guerrero advances or not. The cost of losing an out is just too great.

The Blue Jays never did score. This is where the identity of the players involved can get tricky, because while obviously Yamamoto is a better pitcher than Kiner-Falefa is a hitter, he was, again, in his third inning on zero days' rest. This matchup may never have tilted in Toronto’s direction, but it was probably a better situation at that moment than you’d usually think, because otherwise you can easily argue that IKF's best chance of success here was any outcome that did get the runner over.

Either way: this is a hard situation to win on unless the batter manages not to give up one of the precious outs remaining. You've got three cracks to get the runner in from second. Tough to give one away freely.

That time Trea Turner got a free pass on a 1-2 count

Top 6th, down two runs, runner on first, two outs

“I don’t think I’ve ever seen that before,” Dodgers first baseman Freddie Freeman was seen saying after a most unexpected White Sox choice. Back in 2022, the White Sox gave Turner a free pass to first base, despite having already gotten two strikes on him. A confusing decision even in the moment, it immediately backfired when Max Muncy hit a three-run homer, as Los Angeles would end up winning 11-9.

Now, let’s back up for a second, because things changed quickly. The White Sox were already down by two runs in the top of the sixth, and with two outs, Freeman had laced a single to reach first base. (L.A. win probability at this point: 75.8%.) That meant that the intentional walk to start the plate appearance was never really an option – first base wasn’t open – and it certainly wasn’t on the table when Bennett Sousa got Turner down 0-2 after a called strike and a foul ball.

At this point, with the 0-2 count included, the Dodgers were at 75.1%, but Sousa’s third pitch was a slider in the dirt that went down as a wild pitch, allowing Freeman to reach second. None of this really matters all that much; by the time Tony La Russa gave the intentional walk sign, the Dodgers were standing just above 76%, because having a two-run lead in the sixth with a runner in scoring position is a good place to be.

This one looked wrong. It felt wrong. There's a reason it never happens. Muncy's ensuing home run certainly didn't help, nor did La Russa's defensive comments afterwards, seemingly incredulous that the decision could have been questioned. The math, you'll be stunned to know, doesn't support this choice. But it also wasn't really a needle-mover here. Consider it more of a bizarre choice than a game-losing one.

Babe Ruth’s stolen-base attempt, 1926 World Series Game 7

Bottom 9th, down one run, runner on first, two outs

This one did, infamously, end the entire World Series. While standard-issue win probability doesn’t factor in the importance of the game itself, there’s another version that does, and by that method (“Championship Win Probability,”) this was the most impactful caught-stealing in baseball history. How, after all, could it not be?

With the Yankees down one to the Cardinals in the bottom of the ninth in the Bronx, Ruth walked, putting the tying run on first base with two outs. Bob Meusel, an outfielder who’d hit .315/.373/.470 that year, stepped to the plate. (Lou Gehrig, for years known as the cleanup hitter behind Ruth, was at the time a 23-year-old in the midst of his first great season, and was hitting fifth.) On an 0-1 count, Ruth took off for second, trying to get into scoring position. It didn’t end well. St. Louis catcher Bob O'Farrell fired to Rogers Hornsby, who applied the tag. Game over. Season over.

You don’t really need numbers to know “getting thrown out stealing to end the World Series” is a bad idea, but given how (in)famous this one is, they do tell the tale. Being safe would have helped a little, because now he’s in scoring position. Being caught was more than twice as damaging. It probably felt about 10 million times as damaging in the moment.

The Yankees were obviously in a bad spot to start with, being down a run with two outs. But: What really happened here? Some reports from the time indicate that this wasn’t really a steal attempt so much as a failed hit-and-run, where Meusel was unable to put the ball in play. Others noted that since the pitcher was future Hall of Famer Grover Alexander, banking on a hit wasn’t wise – though the hurler was 39 years old at the time.

For all of his otherworldly skills, Ruth was a notoriously poor basestealer, something like the weakest on record. This was his weakest one. It might have been anyone’s weakest one.