A surprising revelation about the state of free-agent pitching

A few years ago, Greg Maddux said on the podcast of his contemporary, David Cone, that he thought he was going to be a Yankee. But when he left his visit to New York in early December of 1992 without a contract, he made a phone call that changed baseball history.

"I went there to sign with the Yankees," Maddux said. "I was shocked I didn't get offered a contract. It's not college. I didn't go there just for a recruiting trip. ...

"I've heard bits and pieces over the years. I don't know who it was, but [among] the higher-ups, one of the guys had a heart attack and that's why I wasn't made an offer."

When his plane touched down in Chicago for a layover on his route back to Las Vegas, he located a phone to call his agent, Scott Boras. This was before cell phones. That's when he learned the Atlanta Braves had made an offer. Maddux had stated a preference to play for a top contender. The Braves were coming off consecutive World Series losses.

On Dec. 9, 1992, Maddux signed a five-year, $28 million deal with the Braves, a record for a pitcher. The signing was part of a wild offseason when the best position player of the Modern Era -- Barry Bonds -- and arguably the top pitcher, Maddux, changed clubs.

"This one hurts," said then Yankees general manager Gene Michael. "I never thought I could say this, but he's a steal at $28 million. He's a steal."

Maddux was perhaps the greatest free-agent pitcher addition in history.

The Hall of Famer won three consecutive NL Cy Young Awards to begin the contract. He went 89-33 with a 2.13 ERA (197 ERA+) during the deal, and he posted five straight seasons of at least 7 fWAR.

And that winter also marked one of the best free-agent pitching classes in baseball history. Led by Maddux, the class of '93 also included Cone, Doug Drabek, Jimmy Key, John Smiley, Chris Bosio and Ron Darling.

It was a different time. There was no social media. No cell phones. And pitchers, to many, felt like less risky investments.

Everyone who follows baseball understands the troubling injury rates tied to pitchers in today's game.

Due to a variety of factors detailed in MLB's report on injuries like max-effort pitching and year-round throwing as amateurs, too many pitchers have been sidelined. Though the instances of Tommy John surgeries have plateaued in recent years, they remain elevated.

Free agents have become much more expensive since Maddux's peak, too, increasing costs.

MLB teams also don't allow pitchers to work three times through the order as often, so workloads are reduced.

For many, the pitching market feels less certain. That was my belief entering this offseason, which features a talented but flat top tier of pitching talent.

That's what clubs generally feel, too.

Said one front office official of his club's approach: "Just simply do not give out more than four, or even three years, to a pitcher."

But there's just one problem with the assumption that free-agent pitching is not as good a bet today: That's not exactly what is happening.

I studied all free-agent signings dating back to 1991, the first year of available contract data at Cot's Baseball Contracts. I was interested in how the returns of starting pitchers signed on the open market have changed over time.

To study this question, I evaluated each offseason signing class since 1991. If a pitcher signed a five-year deal during the winter of 2018-19, they are part of the '18 class. I then considered each class's fWAR production, innings and dollars earned. (For the study I considered the guaranteed portions of contracts.)

What I found might surprise you. It surprised me.

Now, it's true free-agent starting pitchers were generally more effective in terms of WAR in the 1990s.

The free-agent classes of 1993 (117.85 fWAR, 23 contracts) -- the Maddux class -- and '96 (123.49 fWAR, 24 contracts) are the top two in terms of accumulated fWAR that were studied, and they were also the top two classes in WAR produced per pitcher.

The class of '96 included elite seasons from Cone, Kevin Brown, Andy Benes, Al Leiter and Chuck Finley.

Those classes featured stars, but starting pitchers threw more innings then and measures like fWAR are cumulative.

Even so, some recent classes are holding their own.

Two of the top five WAR returns from a free-agent class have occurred within the last five years (2022 class: 104.47 fWAR, and '23: 97.76 fWAR), and not all those contracts have been completed.

In the 2022 class, 10 unique pitchers produced at least a 3 fWAR season, second only to the elite 1996 class.

The 10 pitchers to meet the threshold from 2022: Alex Cobb, Tyler Anderson, Kevin Gausman, Clayton Kershaw, Corey Kluber, Martín Pérez, Carlos Rodón, Eduardo Rodriguez, Max Scherzer, Justin Verlander.

Free-agent pitching classes are uneven year to year, but the production has not fallen from a cliff.

And if we adjust for innings pitched, if we isolate for the quality of per-inning performance, each of the last eight free-agency classes average at least 2 fWAR per 180 innings among starting pitchers signed.

There's never been a streak like that since at least 1991.

It means the relative skill of free-agent starting pitchers remains as strong as ever.

While there is risk in the pitching market, there's also great reward.

To underscore how important external pitching help can be, we do not have to look far into the past.

The AL champion Blue Jays enjoyed three separate 3-plus fWAR seasons from Gausman (2022 class), and 733 2/3 total innings from him over the last four seasons. He won Game 7 of the ALCS in relief. Chris Bassitt has been a reliable workhorse, too. Max Scherzer pitched 14 1/3 innings this October. Everyone who follows MLB is well aware of how important external additions were to the World Series champion Dodgers' rotation.

Look around at most great team's rotations -- like the 1990s Braves -- and typically there are elite arms leading them.

The starting pitcher remains the most important player in the game -- especially in the postseason, when a greater share of innings are absorbed by the best arms.

Now, what is undoubtedly true is there is greater risk for a club from a financial standpoint.

The average MLB starting pitcher in last year's free-agent market earned $18 million per season last offseason, compared to $8 million in 2012, which marked a 125% increase. In the '12 CBA, the qualifying offer was introduced along with stiffer luxury tax penalties.

Teams have responded by taking risk off the table in terms of favoring short-term deals.

One-year deals for starting pitchers are generally on the rise:

• Percentage of one-year deals in the 1990s: 46.4%
• Percentage of one-year deals in the 2000s: 57.4%
• Percentage of one-year deals in the 2010s: 63.8%
• Percentage of one-year deals in the 2020s: 61.5%

Deals of three-plus years are in general decline, though there is a recent resurgence:

• Percentage of three-plus-year deals in the 1990s: 32.8%
• Percentage of three-plus-year deals in the 2000s: 19.6%
• Percentage of three-plus-year deals in the 2010s: 16.6%
• Percentage of three-plus-year deals in the 2020s: 21.3%

Said one club official: "Plenty of teams -- understandably -- are worried about going too long on free-agent pitching deals."

What's interesting is the longer-term pacts are more productive per season.

Consider that one-year deals average 1.52 fWAR (328 contracts since 1991), which trails three-year deals 1.56 fWAR (104 contracts), four-year deals 1.71 fWAR (53 contracts), five-year contracts 1.92 fWAR (25 contracts) and six-year contracts 2.6 fWAR (small sample of eight contracts). That general trend holds up when adjusting for more recent years.

This makes sense as stars, outlier talents, are better bets to be offered long-term deals and presumably more likely to maintain elite performance and defy aging curves.

And to win in October, teams generally need stars.

While signing a star free-agent arm comes with risk, taking such a chance can be accompanied by great reward. From Maddux to Yoshinobu Yamamoto, star free-agent pitchers continue to alter franchises like few other investments can.