Major League Baseball has changed a lot since new Rockies president of baseball operations Paul DePodesta left the Mets at the end of the 2015 season to spend a decade with the NFL's Cleveland Browns.
If you've been living on a remote island -- or in the NFL -- you've missed a lot.
Professional baseball perhaps has changed more in the past 10 years than it had in the half-century preceding that.
Statcast debuted in 2015, and a host of new technologies, training practices and game strategies proliferated around the same time. They've had a profound impact on the on-field product, even playing a role in prompting rules changes.
For DePodesta of "Moneyball" fame, it can be argued he was away from the game during the Moneyball 2.0 era, when data pivoted from exploiting market inefficiencies involving the evaluation of skills -- like on-base percentage -- to using tech and data to help build better ballplayers. "Moneyball" was largely about applying economics to baseball. Moneyball 2.0 was, and remains, focused upon mastering the game's physics.
It's a different game. Just how different? Let's explore …
Pitching
Change began on the pitching side. That's in large part because it's the rare sport where the defense holds the ball. The pitcher dictates action. So technology and training helped pitchers first. They were the easiest variable to isolate.
Many fans are aware that pitching velocity keeps increasing.
Starting pitchers' average four-seam fastball hit a pitch-tracking record of 94.2 mph in 2025. In 2015, the average was 92.8 mph.
Pitching velocity has likely increased throughout the game's history, with some estimates having velocities of the 1920s sitting in the mid-80s. But weighted-ball programs, a focus on training that skill and more widespread, standardized measuring of velocity accelerated the increase.
Pitchers are also throwing with maximum effort more often. Their minimum fastball velocities are increasing faster than their maximum-velocity throws.
Pitchers' median minimum fastball toss for a season was 88.3 mph in 2015. In recent seasons, the slowest median fastball has reached 91.5 mph. That has outpaced the gain of maximum fastball velocity. Justin Verlander has lamented that he can no longer cruise in games and hold some velocity in reserve. The bar to reach and clear regarding stuff is greater.
Pitching shapes and types have changed, too.
Pitch design has proliferated in professional baseball and even the amateur game, a development ushered in by the combination of high-speed cameras and spin-tracking devices.
The average two-seam greatly improved its horizontal movement to record levels last season. Changeups are darting more. Curveballs also enjoyed their greatest year of vertical break. Pitch shapes are being optimized.
Not only is stuff becoming filthier, but arsenals are expanding.
In 2015, there were 52 pitchers who logged at least 10 innings who threw three different fastball types at a rate of 5% of more. This past season, the three-fastball cohort jumped to 92 strong. (There were exactly 263 pitchers meeting the 10-inning minimum in both seasons.)
Breaking balls? There were 91 pitchers who threw a slider and a curveball at rates of at least 5% in 2015. In '25, there were 125 pitchers who possessed the two distinct breaking balls.
Batters have to face a more complicated calculus that includes seeing fewer fastballs and more breaking and offspeed stuff.
The teams that have harnessed teaching all these concepts have generally enjoyed great advantages.
DePodesta noted the need to embrace new approaches when speaking about his club's starting pitching at the Winter Meetings. “Hopefully, with some of this pitching leadership we hope to bring on board, that we’ll get even more out of some of those guys," he said.
The result of this progress is more strikeouts and fewer balls in play -- a game in which it's more difficult to manufacture runs.
It has also taxed pitchers. Injury rates have increased. Innings are down.
And perhaps where the pro game is most different is regarding pitcher volume and usage.
In 2015, MLB teams combined to use 735 pitchers. Starting pitchers averaged 5.8 innings per start and completed at least six innings in 58.8% of their starts.
In 2025? MLB teams deployed 873 pitchers. Starting pitchers averaged 5.2 innings per start and completed six innings in just 38.8% of their outings.
Rockies starters completed six innings in just 25.9% of starts last season.
It has never been harder for a club to navigate the 1,458 or so innings needed to complete a season for a pitching staff, especially at mile-high elevation.
Hitting
When DePodesta was portrayed in "Moneyball," there was no discussion about A's hitters improving their skills when trying to replace Jason Giambi.
The only skill development story in the book was that of Scott Hatteberg learning to play first base.
"It's not that hard, Scott. Tell him, Wash."
Again, the game has changed a lot.
Throughout much of baseball history, many believed there were ground-ball hitters and fly-ball hitters. The idea of changing a swing to become a different kind of hitter, at least at the pro level, was unheard of.
That changed in the Statcast era, when there was clear data regarding the performance of batted balls at various launch conditions.
Hitters responded to the challenges they faced from pitchers by attempting to do more damage per swing and hitting more fly balls.
In 2015, MLB produced a record-low fly-ball rate of 33.8%. Batted-ball data at FanGraphs dates back to '02.
Those rates have been on a steady march up, reaching a record 38.5% this past season, with average launch angles advancing by nearly 3 degrees since the first year of Statcast.
The data proves batters can adapt in ways that were not thought possible not long ago.
Batters then began pulling more of those fly balls. Outfield fences are closer down the lines because the first concrete-and-steel MLB ballparks were generally crammed into tight city blocks, creating asymmetry.
In 2015, 22.4% of fly balls were hit to a batter's pull side, the lowest in the batted-ball tracking. Since then, it has been a steady march to 26%.
Batters also began hitting balls with more force.
Average exit velocity in 2015 was 88.2 mph. Last season? 89.4 mph.
Moreover, in the three years that we've had bat-speed tracking technology at the MLB level, bat speed has improved each year.
When we can measure something, we can improve it. If we want to lose or gain weight, we begin by stepping on a scale. We measure progress. We adjust off the feedback.
Ted Williams and Babe Ruth had launch angles and exit velocities, too. But the technology didn't exist to measure and show to other players what optimized ball flight looked like. Many of these concepts are not new, but the black-and-white data to guide players is.
While there has been some debate on social media about prioritizing bat speed, the physics is simple: Offensive outcomes are better when a bat is swung faster.
Defense
The game is evolving in terms of defense, too. Some positions are gaining opportunity, but most are losing in an era when strikeouts have conspired to remove so many balls in play.
Second basemen have had their fielding chances decline by 14.1% since 2015. Shortstops? A 13.8% decline. Third basemen chances are down, too, though to a lesser extent at 3.8%. First basemen have had 12.3% fewer opportunities.
Infield defense is less valuable than it was a decade ago. There are fewer ground balls and more strikeouts.
Where are the opportunities increased? The outfield.
As batters have tried to lift balls into the air more often, outfielders' fielding chances have increased 5.2% compared to a decade earlier. That doesn't include the home runs hit above their heads that they cannot field.
And especially in Coors Field, which features the largest surface area to cover in the Majors, it can be argued the Rockies should prioritize as much defensive range and talent in the outfield as possible.
• • •
DePodesta returns to a very different game.
Even the types of coaches successful teams hire -- more often plucked from independent training facilities and inventive college programs -- have changed.
There is one benefit in playing catchup: Many other players, coaches and organizations have experimented throughout this period to see which new practices work, what tech is effective and what is not.
It's one reason why a number of former Astros executives were able to turn around the Orioles' organization more quickly than most expected, notwithstanding last year's disappointing campaign. Those former Astros had tested just about every new piece of tech, every new idea.
There are shortcuts available to new leadership groups. That doesn't mean getting up to speed will be easy, but there is a road map to follow -- to close the gap -- for a club like the Rockies.